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CRIMINAL LAW
LAWFUL OR FAIR?
HOW COPS AND LAYPEOPLE
PERCEIVE GOOD POLICING
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JACOB GARDENER***
Legal authorities and the public live in two separate worlds. One world
is suffused with law, and the other world is suffused with people’s lived
experiences that support their evaluations of fairness. When legal authorities
consider whether police policies and practices are desirable, a framework
regarding the lawfulness of the relevant policies and practices dominates the
conversation. Police departments, their policies, and police officers’ actions
are viewed as right or wrong with reference to constitutional standards, as
interpreted by prosecutors, judges, and other legal actors. In contrast, we
argue that the public is generally insensitive to the question of whether police
officers act consistently with constitutional standards. Instead, the public
evaluates the propriety of police actions primarily by assessing whether
police officers exercise their authority with “procedural fairness.”
We rely on the results of an innovative nationwide experimental survey
involving respondents from representative American cities. Each survey
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respondent completed a questionnaire and then watched and reacted to three
videos of police–citizen interactions. We argue that the actual lawfulness of
police action has at best a minor influence on public evaluations of
appropriate police behavior. Public judgments about whether police officers
should be disciplined for misconduct are largely shaped by people’s
procedural justice evaluations.
We believe that these findings strongly support the need for police to
broaden the framework within which they evaluate a variety of types of
policing policy—racial profiling, zero tolerance policing, street stops,
mosque surveillance, etc.—to include an understanding of how these policies
and practices impact public views about the appropriateness of police
conduct. Whether policies comport with constitutional standards alone is an
impoverished way to judge the rightfulness of police action. Further, our
findings point the way toward creating relationships between the police and
the public that both enhance cooperative efforts to maintain social order and
build people’s identification with and commitment to both the communities
in which they live and to law and government. That broader framework
requires evaluating police policies and practices with reference to public
conceptions of procedural justice.
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INTRODUCTION
When police officers evaluate their own conduct, they typically consider
their actions through a prism of lawfulness, asking what the law entitles them
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to do.1 Police officers are socialized into this way of thinking in police
academies, where recruits memorize hefty volumes that define the legality of
various police actions.2 This learning continues through officers’ careers
when superiors, as well as state and federal prosecutors, judges, and defense
attorneys, evaluate officers’ actions by asking whether the police were
following the law in any given situation. Law determines whether arrests are
valid, whether searches are acceptable, whether shootings are appropriate,
and whether the officers’ actions are more generally sanctioned. Law is
central to the way in which police are evaluated in the course of their
everyday work lives. It is natural, then, for the police to approach any
interaction with a civilian by focusing on what they are legally entitled to do.
When can they stop someone on the street or in a car? When can they search
a person? When can they draw a weapon, and when can they use it?
Police officers and those who work most intimately with them impose a
framework of legality upon the actions the officers undertake, and the police
legitimize their actions through adherence to the law. For example, when a
controversy over mosque surveillance erupted in New York City, the mayor
defended police actions by calling them “legal,” “appropriate,” and
“constitutional.”3 Similarly, a series of policing practices, including zerotolerance policing, racial profiling, and aggressive street stops, have all been
debated in extensive literatures that are concerned with whether they are
legal, appropriate, or constitutional.4 Individual officers legitimate their
actions with respect to lawfulness, too. Irrespective of whether an officer is
making an arrest or justifying a shooting, an officer’s attention is inevitably
directed toward the letter of the law. An officer justifies her actions in terms
of law, and the reactions of prosecutors, judges, and police superiors to her
actions are defined in the same terms. Lawfulness, then, confers protection
and leads to praise and promotion. Unlawful actions, on the other hand, are
undone when possible and punished when egregious. Sanctioning flows from
such lawfulness evaluations, and officers know that the key to avoiding
punishment is to follow the letter of the law.

1
See, e.g., Rachel A. Harmon, The Problem of Policing, 110 MICH. L. REV. 761, 765–68
(2012) (articulating the “conventional paradigm” of police regulation).
2
See infra note 71 (reporting the number of hours rookie police officers spend learning
law in major police departments).
3
Bloomberg Defends ‘Legal,’ ‘Appropriate’ NYPD Monitoring of Muslims, CBS N.Y.
(Feb. 24, 2012, 8:50 PM), http://newyork.cbslocal.com/2012/02/24/bloomberg-calls-nypdmonitoring-of-muslims-legal-and-appropriate/, archived at http://perma.cc/M6WD-KQVD.
4
See, e.g., Wesley G. Skogan & Tracey L. Meares, Lawful Policing, 593 ANNALS AM.
ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 66 (2004).
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We argue that members of the public, when deciding whether the police
have done wrong and deserve some form of sanctioning, are not particularly
sensitive to whether police officers in general or the specific officers they
observe and interact with are actually acting in ways that are consistent with
constitutional standards. Instead, we believe public judgments about whether
police officers were acting unlawfully and should be disciplined for
misconduct are largely shaped by people’s procedural justice evaluations
about the demeanor of the officers during their interactions with them. Data
we have collected from an innovative national study supports our position.
We presented respondents with fact patterns that represent both
constitutionally and unconstitutionally acceptable police behavior. We find
that such variations have little influence upon judgments about whether the
police have behaved appropriately.
The goal of our study was to improve our ability to identify key factors
influencing public views about when police conduct is appropriate or
inappropriate. Specifically, we sought to ascertain the relative influence of
lawfulness and procedural justice in policing upon public judgments about
the appropriateness of police conduct and the need to discipline police
officers. Using an innovative factorial experiment incorporating thirtysecond videos culled from police training tapes and YouTube.com, we
presented videos of real-life interactions of varying intensity between police
officers and citizens to our respondents in order to test how citizens perceive
and evaluate these types of encounters.5 Each of our respondents completed
a questionnaire and then watched and reacted to three videos after reading
manipulated vignettes of real-life police–citizen interactions. The vignettes
described the facts of the interactions respondents viewed on the videos and
provided information about whether the police were acting in one of three
ways: lawfully, unlawfully, or with ambiguous lawfulness. For example, in
one case respondents were told that police stopped a motorist who was
weaving across the traffic lanes on a highway (i.e., for a lawful reason). In
another case, respondents were told that police stopped a person who was
driving normally and within the speed limit (i.e., for an unlawful reason).
And in the third case, we provided no information about the legal background
of the stop.
In our study, perceptions of procedural justice were the most powerful
predictors of whether respondents believed that the police had done wrong
and deserved some form of sanctioning. In contrast, the actual lawfulness of
a police officer’s initial conduct in deciding to approach and interact with the
person shown had, at best, a minor influence upon people’s evaluations of
5

These videos are available upon request from the authors.
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police lawfulness and culpability for subsequent behavior between the person
and the officer during the stop. The public, it seems, does not react to the
actual lawfulness of either the actions of the police in general or to the
lawfulness of the decisions of specific police officers when evaluating their
behavior.
Does this mean that the public is indifferent to police legality? Our
findings suggest that, on the contrary, the public is strongly influenced by the
perceived legality of police actions. However, perceived legality is only
marginally connected to actual legality. Whether the police are, in fact, acting
legally is not central to the judgments the public makes about the
appropriateness of their actions or to the public’s desire to punish the police.
This, of course, raises the question of what basis the public has for
evaluating police behavior as appropriate. To answer this question, it is
important to first note that a great deal of constitutional law is concerned with
the justification of a legal actor’s decision to take an action (or not).6 For
example, is there a reason for stopping a person, for questioning him, for
searching him, etc.? Is it acceptable for an officer to draw her weapon? If so,
what type of weapon is justified (fists, club, Taser, gun)? And what level of
force is allowable? While these are all legally central issues, they have little
to do with the acting officer’s demeanor. There are no constitutional
standards about how respectfully the police are required to treat citizens. Our
findings support the conclusion, however, that police demeanor strongly
affects public inferences of legality and the resulting impulse to punish. In
particular, a large body of social science research suggests that the public
reacts to whether they believe police officers are exercising their authority
fairly—something referred to in the literature as procedural justice.7
Thus, we argue that there is a fundamental disconnect between the
lawfulness frame that characterizes police-thinking about the propriety of
their conduct and the procedural fairness frame through which the public
evaluates police and their actions. In colloquial terms, legal authorities and
the public live in two separate worlds. In the police world, actual lawfulness
legitimates the exercise of police authority, and the police punishment is
linked to whether their conduct violates the law. In the public world,
procedural justice leads to perceived lawfulness, and it is the unfair exercise
6
See, e.g., Tracey L. Meares, The Law and Social Science of Stop and Frisk, 10 ANN. REV.
L. & SOC. SCI. 335, 337–42 (2014) (examining constitutional history of stop and frisk
decisions).
7
The seminal work in this arena is TOM R. TYLER, WHY PEOPLE OBEY THE LAW (1990).
For a recent review of this literature see Tom R. Tyler et al., The Impact of Psychological
Science on Policing in America: Procedural Justice, Legitimacy, and Effective Law
Enforcement, 16 PSYCHOL. SCI. PUB. INT. 75, 75–109 (2015). See also infra Part I.B.
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of police authority that leads to perceived illegality and the desire to punish
police. Recognizing this disconnect is the key to understanding many of the
problems that arise when police and community residents interact.
The remainder of this Article aims to explain the basis of this
disconnect, offer empirical support for our conclusions, and suggest some
implications of our research. Definition of terms comes first. The meaning of
lawfulness is largely self-evident. In the first Part, we explain why lawfulness
can be a problematic yardstick for measuring appropriate police behavior.
Procedural justice is the foundation of our model of fairness, and that term
likely is not self-evident, so we spend some time explaining that concept in
depth. We follow our definitions with a description of a theoretical
framework that illustrates the ways in which the procedural fairness of the
conduct of authorities can be different from the lawfulness of it. We then lay
out evidence from a large-scale experimental survey in an attempt to support
this assertion: when people decide whether to punish police officers, they
place greater weight upon their evaluations of the fairness of police conduct
than upon its objective lawfulness. We conclude with some preliminary
implications of the relationship between our findings and theory.
I. DEFINING TERMS
A. THE PROBLEMATICS OF LAWFULNESS

Law confers upon the state and its authorities, such as police, a
monopoly on the use of coercion to enforce laws and maintain order. This
idea famously underlies the Weberian notion of legitimacy in the exercise of
police authority.8 Police compliance with the law, then, is one of the most
important aspects of law within a democratic society. The rule of law actually
goes hand-in-hand with the public’s tolerance of the state’s exercise of
discretion. Consider the fact that it is the very existence of rules of law
designed to limit the power police officers exert over us that justifies the
claim that police compose a rule-bound institution, which we all agree should
be empowered to make discretionary decisions to carry out the basic tasks we
expect of law enforcement—the pursuit of justice, the protection of

8
We refer here to Max Weber’s notion that police were created to operationalize the state’s
legitimate monopoly on physical force. The police have a monopoly on power to enforce the
law. MAX WEBER, THE THEORY OF SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC ORGANIZATION 154 (Talcott
Parsons ed., A.M. Henderson & Talcott Parsons trans., Free Press 1964) (1947). For an
engaging explication of this idea and how it relates to the development of the modern police
officer, see Rubén G. Rumbaut & Egon Bittner, Changing Conceptions of the Police Role: A
Sociological Review, 1 CRIME & JUST. 239, 269–70 (1979).
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individual liberties, and, of course, the battle against crime.9 This observation
is almost banal, and yet it is critical: recognizing the centrality of law—and
of the constitutional standards under which law is enacted—to the existence
and mission of policing sets up the possibility that the proper, and perhaps
even best, way to evaluate police conduct is primarily with respect to legal
rules—especially constitutional ones.10 It is likely obvious at this point that
we will take issue with this view.
Our goal in this analysis is to demonstrate that solely legal yardsticks
are not the best, most complete way to evaluate what legal authorities do. At
the very least, we show that most members of the public who engage in such
evaluations when they deal with police in their everyday lives do not rely
very much on the law as such when making those evaluations. Therefore, we
think that lawfulness as a yardstick does not capture people’s everyday
experiences with police and police practices.
In making this distinction, we do not mean to argue that issues of law
and legality are unimportant to the proper operation of policing as an
institution. On the contrary, we view these issues as central to good policing.
However, we regard public views about the propriety of police conduct as an
equally important and, in our view, more widely neglected issue when
thinking about police. Rather than examining the basis of public judgments
about the rightness or wrongness of police conduct in the context of police
discipline, legal scholars and policing professionals have both tended to
assume that the public is focused upon whether police are acting lawfully.
Many assume that by following the law, police are building popular
legitimacy in their communities.11 As a consequence, police authorities
frequently express puzzlement over the consistent finding of public opinion
9

The alternative is, of course, a despotic state, which is the reason why the concept of
legality is a foundational principle of criminal law and why control of discretion, particularly
police discretion, is one of the central problems of constitutional criminal procedure. For one
of the best discussions of the role of legality and the justifications for the legality principle,
including separation of powers concerns, notice arguments, and discretion control, see John
Calvin Jeffries, Jr., Legality, Vagueness, and the Construction of Penal Statutes, 71 VA. L.
REV. 189 (1985). For a discussion of the importance of controlling discretion in criminal
procedure while also promoting individual rights, including a detailed history of the rise of
criminal procedural rights in the context of the need for and dangers of police discretion, see
Dan M. Kahan & Tracey L. Meares, The Coming Crisis of Criminal Procedure, 86 GEO. L.J.
1153 (1998).
10
See Skogan & Meares, supra note 4 (discussing lawfulness and constitutionality in
particular as a way of judging good police conduct).
11
See NAT’L INST. OF JUSTICE, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, RESEARCH FOR PRACTICE:
ENHANCING POLICE INTEGRITY 1 (2005); Jon B. Gould & Stephen D. Mastrofski, Suspect
Searches: Assessing Police Behavior Under the U.S. Constitution, 3 CRIMINOLOGY & PUB.
POL’Y 315, 318 (2004).
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polls that perceived police legitimacy is at best moderately high; that levels
of police legitimacy are constant across the past several decades; that
minorities show strikingly lower levels of perceived legitimacy; and finally,
that minorities have not increased their perceptions of police legitimacy in
recent years.12 Do these findings suggest that the police are not, in reality,
following the law? Analyses of police performance suggest the opposite.13
So, actual lawfulness is not leading to popular legitimacy.
In our view, the key to understanding this seeming paradox is to
understand that the public does not define lawfulness or determine the
appropriateness of sanctioning the police through the same lens of legality
that police and other legal authorities use. This clash between the way that
the public assesses police conduct and the way that legal scholars and police
professionals do reflects two different worlds within which different issues
are central to evaluations of police wrongdoing. Our colleague, Bruce
Ackerman, labels these two worlds as those of the “Scientific Policymaker”
and the “Ordinary Observer.”14 Drawing upon their professional training,
Scientific Policymakers apply rules about when and how they can
appropriately impose their decisions on the community. Their focus is on the
rules governing the decisionmaking that occurs based upon interpreting the
situation before a contact occurs. In contrast, Ordinary Observers focus on
the comportment and demeanor of the legal authorities. This means that
public attention is paid to how legal authorities act once they have decided
to engage a person and are implementing their decision by interacting with
members of the public.
We argue that it is consequently important for police to focus upon two
benchmarks of performance: (1) behaving in ways that are consistent with
the law, and (2) acting so as to create and maintain the popular view that they
are legitimate, and their conduct is appropriate, within the communities
where they work when exercising their policing authority. The first

12

See generally MARK PEFFLEY & JON HURWITZ, JUSTICE IN AMERICA: THE SEPARATE
REALITIES OF BLACKS AND WHITES (2010) (reviewing public opinion polls concerning
minority views about the police in different years).
13
See NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, FAIRNESS AND EFFECTIVENESS IN POLICING 252–90
(2004) (Wesley Skogan & Kathleen Frydl eds., 2004) [hereinafter FAIRNESS AND
EFFECTIVENESS IN POLICING] (detailing studies of police compliance with various
constitutional standards).
14
See BRUCE A. ACKERMAN, PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE CONSTITUTION 4–5 (1977)
(explaining that proper construction of the Constitution’s Compensation Clause depends on
two ideal types of modern legal analysis: the perspective of the “Scientific Policymaker” or
the perspective of the “Ordinary Observer”). Here, Ackerman’s scientific policymakers are
police professionals, while ordinary observers are members of the public.
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benchmark is about police awareness of the Constitution and the law; the
second is about police comportment and demeanor on the streets.15
Our claim about the basis of public evaluations of police conduct is an
empirical rather than a normative one. Simply put, if we examine how most
people in their everyday lives actually evaluate the interactions that they have
with police officers and agencies, it is immediately apparent that people do
not rely on the framework of the actual lawfulness of police action when
coming to conclusions about appropriate police behavior. Instead, they look
to indicia of procedural justice. As we explain below, procedural justice and
related factors provide the basis for social psychological determinations of
legitimacy.16
This distinction is one that is familiar to psychologists who study a
phenomenon they label the “fundamental attribution” error, which reflects
the way in which people attribute intention, motivation, and character to
actions they see in the foreground, in spite of mitigating situational factors
that can also explain the actions and potentially diminish judgments about
character, volition, and responsibility.17 Researchers find that people tend to
focus upon a person and her behavior within a given situation while ignoring
or underweighting the situational framework within which that person is
acting. As an example, people typically believe the statements that people
make reflect their true feelings, even when they speak under coercion or
15

There is potentially another relevant metric of good policing—whether police are
effective at reducing or preventing crime. As one of us has explained elsewhere, this metric is
of relatively recent vintage. See Tracey L. Meares, The Good Cop: Knowing the Difference
Between Lawful or Effective Policing and Rightful Policing—And Why It Matters, 54 WM. &
MARY L. REV. 1865, 1871–75 (2013). However, while this piece focuses upon how the public
assesses whether police have exercised their authority correctly in any particular instance, a
strong argument can be made that police effectiveness at crime control simply misses the mark.
As the Supreme Court has noted, “the enshrinement of constitutional rights necessarily takes
certain policy choices off the table.” District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 636 (2008).
The preceding quote indicates a potential clash between lawfulness on the one hand and
effectiveness on the other as ways to assess good policing. Procedural fairness is yet another,
which we explore in depth through empirical methods in this Article.
16
See TOM R. TYLER & YUEN J. HUO, TRUST IN THE LAW: ENCOURAGING PUBLIC
COOPERATION WITH THE POLICE AND COURTS 14–15 (2002) (explaining the difference between
and relevance of procedural justice and trust-based motivation to decision acceptance and
voluntary compliance). It is important to note that David Beetham has offered a different view
of legitimacy that is not as thoroughgoing in its empiricism as is Tyler and Huo’s. Indeed,
Beetham includes lawfulness in his definition of legitimacy. For Beetham’s conception of
legitimacy, see DAVID BEETHAM, THE LEGITIMATION OF POWER (1991). Beetham’s approach
brings together the normative and the descriptive.
17
See generally RICHARD NISBETT & LEE ROSS, HUMAN INFERENCE: STRATEGIES AND
SHORTCOMINGS OF SOCIAL JUDGMENT (1980) (explaining and discussing fundamental
attribution error).
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receive incentives.18 Coercion and incentives are, to many, simply
background factors that are overwhelmed by the central figure in the
situation: the person who is speaking or acting. Applying these ideas to the
context we describe in this Article, those who observe police officers
interacting with citizens often ignore the situational cues provided when
those officers undertake their actions, lawfully or not. Instead, people focus
on what is more salient to them—the actions the officers actually engage in
once they are dealing with a person. When people do this, they make
inferences in a way that underweights the legally central question of whether
the actions of the officers were legally justified to begin with.
In a series of papers and conferences, Harvard Law School professor
Jon Hanson and his colleagues have highlighted the ways in which people
underweight the influence of situational factors and focus too much on an
actor’s behaviors.19 When people make judgments of culpability and
blameworthiness of punishment, they often fall prey to situationism.20
Interestingly, commenting upon the same situationism Hanson notes, Craig
Haney suggests a cure in response to people’s tendency to focus on behavior
in the situation and not the situational context: expanded public legal
education. He argues that there is a need to “make law a salient part of the
situation.”21 Echoing the general argument that people underweight the
background factors in a situation, including what the law is and whether it is
being followed, Haney notes that if people were better trained in legal
doctrine, they would be more effective in overcoming their natural tendency
to focus on the demeanor of police and more sensitive to the context of the
police’s actions (i.e., whether that context legitimated lawful police
actions).22 As it stands, however, Haney suggests that people naturally fall
into a pattern of focusing on the highly salient behaviors of legal authorities,
18

Id.
See generally Adam Benforado & Jon Hanson, The Great Attributional Divide: How
Divergent Views of Human Behavior Are Shaping Legal Policy, 57 EMORY L.J. 311 (2008)
(showing that people focus upon inferences about the character of an actor rather than the
situation); Jon Hanson & David Yosifon, The Situational Character: A Critical Realist
Perspective on the Human Animal, 93 GEO. L.J. 1 (2004) (same). The tendency to ignore
situational cues also has been recently noted at Harvard Law School’s Project on Law and
Mind Sciences website. See Situationist Materials—Links, PROJECT ON L. & MIND SCI. AT
HARV. L. SCH., http://isites.harvard.edu/icb/icb.do?keyword=k13943&tabgroupid=icb.tab
group43841, archived at http://perma.cc/N5G3-68MA.
20
See Lee Ross & Donna Shestowsky, Two Social Psychologists’ Reflections on
Situationism and the Criminal Justice System, in IDEOLOGY, PSYCHOLOGY, AND LAW 612, 613
(Jon Hanson ed., 2012).
21
Craig Haney, Making Law Modern: Toward a Contextual Model of Justice, 8 PSYCHOL.
PUB. POL’Y & L. 3, 11–13 (2002).
22
See id.
19
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such as police officers, and underweighting situational issues, such as the fact
pattern to which the officers responded before they took action and whether
those facts merited state intervention.
In making our argument, we do not mean to suggest that people fail to
understand the idea of rights or lawfulness. People do know that they have
rights and that there are rules that constrain police behavior.23 However, their
perceptions do not line up with the interpretations of the lawfulness of police
actions that those who have some degree of formal legal training, such as
lawyers, prosecutors, judges, and even police officers, would make. It is no
doubt true that perceptions of police lawfulness also impact the assessments
that people make about the appropriateness of police behavior.24 We will
show, however, that such perceived police lawfulness is itself a reflection of
judgments about the procedural justice of police actions. Based upon the
findings that we present later in this Article, it is clear that people’s judgments
flow from the more salient police actions that they observe during
interactions and less from the background factors that determine the actual
legality of police conduct. It is evaluations of the fairness of police conduct,
in other words, rather than actual lawfulness that shape assessments of the
appropriateness of punishing police.
B. PROCEDURAL JUSTICE AS FAIRNESS

In the social psychological literature, judgments regarding fairness
depend primarily upon a model of procedural justice,25 and that model, in
turn, has a few dimensions. First, whether people have opportunities for
23

See Skogan & Meares, supra note 4, at 81. See generally THE PSYCHOLOGY OF RIGHTS
DUTIES (Norman J. Finkel & Fathali M. Moghaddam eds., 2005) (discussing what
research findings suggest about people’s knowledge of their legal rights).
24
Note here that we said “perceptions” of lawfulness. As we will demonstrate, our
research suggests, importantly, that at least within the realm of the constitutionality of police
conduct, there is little relationship between what people perceive to be lawful and
constitutional and what is objectively the case. Instead, there is a strong relationship between
perceived lawfulness and perceptions of procedural justice.
25
See generally E. ALLAN LIND & TOM R. TYLER, THE SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY OF
PROCEDURAL JUSTICE (1988); Steven L. Blader & Tom R. Tyler, A Four-Component Model of
Procedural Justice: Defining the Meaning of a “Fair” Process, 29 PERSONALITY & SOC.
PSYCHOL. BULL. 747 (2003) (presenting findings that provide evidence in favor of a
hypothesized four-component model of procedural justice wherein people are influenced by
two aspects of formal procedures of the group—those that indicate quality of decisionmaking
and those that relate to quality of treatment—and concluding that people are separately
influenced by two distinct aspects of authorities with whom they deal—the quality of the
decisions authorities make and the quality of treatment they receive from authorities); Tom R.
Tyler & E. Allan Lind, A Relational Model of Authority in Groups, in 25 ADVANCES IN
EXPERIMENTAL SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 115, 158–59 (1992).
AND
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participation shapes their views about their experiences. People report higher
levels of satisfaction in encounters with authorities if they feel that they have
an opportunity to explain their situation and their perspective on it—i.e., to
tell their story.26 Second, people react to the fairness of officer
decisionmaking.27 That is, they look to signs that tell them about
decisionmaker neutrality, objectivity and factuality of decisionmaking, and
transparency and consistency in decisionmaking. Third, people care about
how officers treat them. Specifically, people desire to be treated with
courtesy and dignity, with respect for their rights, and with interpersonal
politeness.28 Fourth, in their interactions with police, people want to believe
that authorities are acting out of a sense of benevolence toward them. They
want to believe that the motivations of the authorities are sincere, benevolent,
well-intentioned, and that the officers are trying to be responsive to people’s
concerns.29 When we use the term “procedural fairness” as a shorthand term
here, we are referring to this collection of ideas.
One important consequence of people’s perceptions of procedural
fairness according to these terms is that they lead to popular beliefs of
legitimacy. Legitimacy is a term with many meanings in different contexts.
When we use the term “legitimacy,” we mean a “property that a rule or an
authority has when others feel obligated to voluntarily defer to that rule or
authority . . . . [A] legitimate authority is one that is regarded by people as
entitled to have its decisions and rules accepted and followed by others.”30
Obviously, by using the term legitimacy in this way, we are not promoting a
normative vision of it. Our argument is not aimed toward a normative model
with a justification of when people ought to defer to authorities; rather, our
claim is descriptive in the social-science sense that we examine here whether
people do defer (or at least say that they do).31 A robust body of social-science
evidence from around the world shows that people are more likely to

26

See Tom R. Tyler, Enhancing Police Legitimacy, 593 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC.
SCI. 84, 94 (2004).
27
See Tom R. Tyler & Cheryl J. Wakslak, Profiling and Police Legitimacy: Procedural
Justice, Attributions of Motive, and Acceptance of Police Authority, 42 CRIMINOLOGY 253,
255 (2004).
28
See id. at 277.
29
See id.
30
FAIRNESS AND EFFECTIVENESS IN POLICING, supra note 13, at 297 (citations omitted).
31
Our focus will be on perceived obligation as opposed to personal morality. It is true that
personal morality has been shown to be an important motivator of compliance. However, the
voluntary deference that results from public legitimacy is also powerful—especially as
compared to deference resulting from fear of the potential imposition of formal punishment,
i.e., from variations in the perceived likelihood of being caught and punished for wrongdoing.
For the seminal work on this point, see TYLER, supra note 7, at 3–5.
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voluntarily obey the law when they believe that authorities have the right to
tell them what to do.32 Indeed, a finding that many readers may find odd is
that people typically are motivated to comply with the law more by the belief
that the authorities with whom they are dealing are legitimate than they are
by fear of punishment.33 And, as we outline below, legitimacy is linked to
whether the authorities treat people with dignity and fairness when exercising
authority—i.e., whether they are procedurally fair. Policing in ways that the
public recognizes as legitimate is one of the many ways that legal authorities
build and replicate a strong government.
There are many consequences of legitimacy in everyday policing. One
that has been widely studied is the willingness to defer to the police.34
Another, which is our focus here, has been less widely studied but is equally
central to police authority—that is the extent to which people accept police
intrusions into their lives as appropriate and legal. Empowerment of police
to exercise authority within a community varies, ranging from endorsing
officers’ right to do whatever they think is appropriate when managing social
order, to viewing police authority as limited. Our concern here is with the
degree to which people accept various types of police conduct in their
dealings with citizens. When the public does not accept such conduct, that
disapproval manifests in the perception that police have exceeded their lawful
authority and ought to be sanctioned in some way.
What predicts whether people will evaluate the actions of police as
being legal, appropriate, and reasonable? As we have noted, one model is
lawfulness, which is concerned with whether the police are acting in accord
with the rule of law as framed by the Constitution, enacted by the legislature,
and interpreted by the courts. According to this model, which is central to the
professional judgments police make, acting according to the law leads to
public support and the popular acceptance of police discretion when
exercising authority.
Notably, research on the basis of public views about legitimacy of police
and of police actions suggests that objective lawfulness is not the primary
issue that people consider when they are evaluating a police officer’s actions.
Rather, people place the greatest weight on how that officer exercised her
power as opposed to the justification of police intrusions—i.e., whether the
32

See generally LEGITIMACY AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE: INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVES
(Braga et al. eds., 2007) (exploring the impact of perceptions of legitimacy in criminal justice
systems across the globe).
33
See TYLER, supra note 7, at 44–45 (demonstrating the relative weight of deterrence and
legitimacy as motivators of legal compliance).
34
See, e.g., TYLER & HUO, supra note 16, at 126–29 (summarizing the factors underlying
individual decision acceptance during interactions with police and judges).
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officer’s actions were fair as we have defined that term. This finding holds
across a wide variety of authorities. Researchers have studied public
evaluations of police officers, judges, political leaders, managers, and
teachers, and the findings are consistent: conclusions regarding legitimacy
are tied more closely to judgments of the procedural justice of actions than
to objective lawfulness.35 Thus, the dynamic of legitimacy that we are
presenting is that people focus on how police act when dealing with the public
rather than whether police are acting lawfully.
The model of legitimacy we offer reflects the reality that interactions
with the police are interpersonal experiences. Research suggests that people
focus upon police behavior because their treatment by the police provides
them with important information about their standing and status in the
community—information that shapes their identities and feelings of selfworth.36 A key aspect of police authority, then, involves the impact of police
actions upon people’s personal identity and feelings of status and selfrespect. For example, if a police officer treats a person rudely during an
encounter, that person will understand that treatment as providing
information relevant to how legal authorities view him or her, as well as the
group to which he or she belongs. The conclusion likely will be a negative
one.
According to this view, a key motivator to people is how they feel the
authorities view them and others in their community. Are they respected as a
person? Are their values and lifestyle respected? Do legal authorities care
about their needs and concerns and view those needs and concerns as worthy
of their attention and consideration? All of these issues, which are intertwined
with personal identity and feelings of self-worth, are shaped by how people
are treated by legal authorities. People feel valued and respected when they
are treated with courtesy and politeness by police officers who listen to and
consider what they say and who are seen as sincere in their desire to do what
is best for them and for others in their community. People can feel respected
and valued even when they are being punished if the police treat them in these
status-affirming ways. For example, Tyler and Jeffrey Fagan show in their
research that the police can give a person a ticket or even arrest that person,
while simultaneously enhancing the legitimacy of the police in that person’s
eyes, if the officers are courteous, respectful, and fair to the person they are

35
See Tyler, supra note 26, at 91 (collecting various studies); see also Tracey L. Meares
& Tom R. Tyler, Justice Sotomayor and the Jurisprudence of Procedural Justice, 123 YALE
L.J. F. 525 (2014), http://yalelawjournal.org/forum/justice-sotomayor-and-the-jurisprudenceof-procedural-justice, archived at http://perma.cc/TXG9-ZBDK.
36
See LIND & TYLER, supra note 25, at 140–43.
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dealing with.37 By affirming and enhancing a person’s status within society,
the police are giving that person something valuable—a positive sense of self
and identity—which is more important to them than the material
consequences of the outcome of their interaction with the police.
To sum up, when we say that people evaluate the conduct of legal
authorities with respect to procedural fairness as opposed to lawfulness, we
are referring to these notions of legitimacy and procedural justice and to the
relational connections between people and legal authorities that underlie
them. The fact that people have a relational connection to legal authorities
provides those authorities with an alternative basis for creating and
maintaining their legitimacy that is not linked to either the lawfulness of their
conduct or the nature of any sanctions they threaten to deliver, which they
may use to enforce the law. And as we will show, these issues of identity and
status dominate people’s evaluations of police officers’ actions, rather than
more abstract issues of lawfulness.
II. THEORETICAL FRAME
When lawyers, law professors, and criminal justice professionals
observe what they consider to be the overexercise of state power in the form
of stops and arrests—New York City38 and Philadelphia39 might provide
ready examples—they move quickly to describe the problem as a legal one
in which the police are not following legal rules as understood by scholars.
Members of these groups typically frame their observations in terms of
constitutional law—especially textual provisions of the Bill of Rights—to

37

See Tom R. Tyler & Jeffrey Fagan, Legitimacy and Cooperation: Why Do People Help
the Police Fight Crime in Their Communities?, 6 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 231, 255–56, 261
(2008).
38
Between 2006 and 2009, New York City cops performed around 500,000 street stops
each year, up from approximately 160,000 in 2003. See DELORES JONES-BROWN ET AL., JOHN
JAY COLL. OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE, STOP, QUESTION & FRISK POLICING PRACTICES IN NEW YORK
CITY: A PRIMER 4 (2010), http://www.roosevelthouse.hunter.cuny.edu/devdev/wp-content/
uploads/2013/11/PRIMER_electronic_version.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/PK6NYURL; Report of Jeffrey Fagan, Ph.D. at 18, David Floyd v. City of New York, 861 F. Supp.
2d 274 (2012) (No. 09-01034), https://ccrjustice.org/sites/default/files/assets/files/Expert_
Report_JeffreyFagan.pdf.
39
In Philadelphia, data for 2009 indicate that the Philadelphia police department made
253,000 pedestrian stops. Robert Moran, N.Y. Mayor Takes Shot at Philly over Stop-and-Frisk,
PHILA. INQUIRER, May 25, 2012, http://articles.philly.com/2012-05-25/news/31839461_1_
homicide-rate-stop-and-frisk-program-homicide-count, archived at http://perma.cc/T45UT84N. Given Philadelphia’s population, these numbers yield an even higher per capita
encounter rate than New York City’s. See id.
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describe the police behavior that they find objectionable.40 Arrests and stops
become problematic because they do not conform to the Fourth (and
sometimes Fifth) Amendments, which restrict and circumscribe the
acceptable behavior of the police. If the constitutional violation is the
problem, then the remedy, seemingly, is apparent. The architecture of law
and rights both describe and solve problematic urban street policing by
suggesting objective rules to which the police should adhere.
This tendency to describe problematic policing in legal terms is more
than a bit striking in light of the realities of policing on the street. While it is
true that various bodies of law—constitutional law among them—shape
police authority, it is also true that the exercise of police power takes place
largely at the discretion of individual police officers. Everything about the
job makes this discretion difficult to monitor. Most police officers typically
work alone and are not under the direct gaze of a supervisor.41 Heavily armed
officers leave the station each day (or night) frequently alone or with a single
partner.42 At the end of a shift when they return to the station, we know very
little about what they did during the preceding eight hours or so except
through the sparse reports they fill out before going home—unless, of course,
they make an arrest, which turns out to be quite a rare event among the many
tasks that cops perform on any given day.43 Even when police officers
document their actions, for example by completing street stop reports, their
reports are minimal, and suspicion often persists that much police activity
goes unrecorded.44
Problems associated with knowing what the police do are exacerbated
because police deal more with “unsavory characters”—criminal suspects, the
40
Legal scholars and lawyers commonly reference the Fourth Amendment of the U.S.
Constitution when looking to legal provisions to explain the wrongfulness of racial profiling.
See, e.g., Tracey Maclin, Terry v. Ohio’s Fourth Amendment Legacy: Black Men and Police
Discretion, 72 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 1271 (1998) (arguing that more stringent Fourth
Amendment standards would address problems related to racial profiling of African-American
men on the street); Tracey Maclin, What Can Fourth Amendment Doctrine Learn from
Vagueness Doctrine?, 3 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 398 (2001).
41
See generally JEANNINE BELL, POLICING HATRED: LAW ENFORCEMENT, CIVIL RIGHTS
AND HATE CRIME (2002) (discussing everyday police tasks in the context of the policing of
hate crime).
42
See id.
43
See Bernard E. Harcourt & Tracey L. Meares, Randomization and the Fourth
Amendment, 78 U. CHI. L. REV. 809, 821–29 (2011) (reviewing studies of urban police
workload and showing that patrol-and-stop activities are much more common than executing
search and arrest warrants).
44
See JONES-BROWN ET AL., supra note 38, at 4 (describing an estimate that New York
police officers report approximately 70% of all stops on UF-250 forms (leaving 30% of stops
presumably unreported)).
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homeless, drunks, and prostitutes—in potentially troublesome situations than
they do with “ordinary citizens.” This means both that those with whom cops
interact are not likely to report much about encounters they have and that
opportunities for corruption are higher than they might otherwise be. Finally,
it is difficult to punish police officers that violate rules, given the strong union
rules that constrain those who manage street cops.45 In such a world,
specifying strict rule compliance seems somewhat of a mismatch with the
realities of everyday police activity. Broad discretion allows police to shape,
redescribe, and recategorize situations and contexts in ways that defy strictly
defined codes. This allows police officers to describe what actually happened
in ways that they know meet acceptable standards of conduct. No police
officer would ever say that they stopped someone on a whim or a hunch, nor
would they say that they stopped someone because they were Black.
Recently, the way in which police manage their discretion has become
a contentious point in policing as departments have developed strategies
based upon the widespread use of stop and frisk approaches that bring
officers into frequent contact with people on the street.46 Increased police
discretion has led to a series of public controversies over racial profiling,
zero-tolerance policing, aggressive police stops, and covert surveillance.47
45

See DARREL W. STEPHENS, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, POLICE DISCIPLINE: A CASE FOR
CHANGE 5 (2011), https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/234052.pdf, archived at http://perma.
cc/V77Q-U3M7.
46
Many municipalities argue that stop and frisk policies reduce crime. See, e.g., Heather
MacDonald, Op-Ed, Fighting Crime Where the Criminals Are, N.Y. TIMES, June 26, 2010, at
A19; Ray Rivera & Al Baker, Police Cite Help from Stop-and-Frisk Data in 170 Cases, N.Y.
TIMES, July 17, 2010, at A15; Kate Taylor, Police Street Stops Hit a Record, Rising 14%, N.Y.
TIMES, Feb. 15, 2012, at A21; Raymond W. Kelly, Stop-and-Frisk Bill Imperils N.Y.: Ray
Kelly Says Database Helps NYPD Protect Young Black Men, N.Y. DAILY NEWS (July 13,
2010, 4:00 AM), http://www.nydailynews.com/opinion/stop-and-frisk-bill-imperils-n-y-raykelly-database-helps-nypd-protect-young-black-men-article-1.468308, archived at http://
perma.cc/J5FL-3WRC; Heather MacDonald, Stop & Frisk Facts, N.Y. POST (May 22, 2012,
4:00 AM), http://nypost.com/2012/05/22/stop-frisk-facts/, archived at http://perma.cc/EU2YCTSU; Michael Howard Saul & Sean Gardiner, Kelly Shifts Policy on Stop and Frisk, WALL
ST. J. (May 17, 2012, 11:11 PM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB100014240527023033605
4577410460162725248, archived at http://perma.cc/MP6F-G2VY; SF Mayor Considering
Police Stop-and-Frisk Policy, KCRA (June 28, 2012, 11:59 AM), http://www.kcra.com/news/
SF-mayor-considering-police-stop-and-frisk-policy/15334534, archived at http://perma.cc/
Y6KX-LVYY.
47
Critics have filed suit alleging civil rights violations. See Al Baker, City Minorities More
Likely to Be Frisked, N.Y. TIMES, May 13, 2010, at A1; Al Baker & William K. Rashbaum,
City Police Ask Panel to Review Crime Statistics, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 6, 2011, at A1; Al Baker
& Ray Rivera, Thousands of Street Stops by New York Police Were Legally Unjustified, a
Study Finds, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 27, 2010, at A22; Tamer El-Ghobashy et al., Judge Clears StopFrisk Class Action, WALL ST. J., May 17, 2012, at A19; John A. Eterno, Op-Ed., Policing by
the Numbers, N.Y. TIMES, June 18, 2012, at A23; James Forman, Jr. & Trevor Stutz, Op-Ed.,
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These controversies in turn have led to efforts to address the constitutionality
of police practices by, for example, trying to establish whether patterns of
police stops reflect “racial” profiling or whether police are constitutionally
justified in stopping the large numbers of people that they deal with on the
street. There is now a considerable body of scholarly literature describing
how issues of legality can be dealt with in the context of people’s efforts to
control crime, particularly violent drug crime.48
Efforts to define the appropriate limits of police behavior are further
complicated by the fact that not everyone decries endowing the police on the
street with more flexibility and discretion to do their jobs. Police discretion
recently has been celebrated as a way to increase the utility of policing,
training officers to be more flexible in methods of crime management and
more responsive to community concerns and problems.49 All of this means
that good policing is more likely to be achieved by measuring cops against
broad, subjective, and tactile norms and standards, as opposed to sharp-edged
rules.50
We think that relying on the lawfulness of police conduct (i.e., the
compliance of police officers with laws and constitutional standards in order
to satisfy public demand for good policing) inevitably misses the mark.
Moreover, an emphasis on lawfulness is even more likely to lead to a
dissatisfied public as we move toward greater efforts to train officers to be
flexible and adaptive. The theory we have reviewed here strongly implies that
lawfulness alone inadequately captures what the public cares about when
validating good police conduct. The reason is that the aspects of police

Beyond Stop-and-Frisk, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 20, 2012, at A23; Sean Gardiner, Police Officer
Sues, Alleging Quota System, WALL ST. J., Feb. 24, 2012, at A17; Thomas Kaplan, Cuomo
Seeks Cut in Frisk Arrests, N.Y. TIMES, June 4, 2012, at A1; Ray Rivera et al., A Few Blocks,
4 Years, 52,000 Police Stops, N.Y. TIMES, July 12, 2010, at A1; Editorial, Stop-and-Frisk
Needs Reform, PHILA. TRIB., June 24, 2011, at 10-A; Kate Taylor, Gay Rights Groups Are
Joining Opposition to Police Stops, N.Y. TIMES, June 5, 2012, at A17; Christian Dolmetsch,
New York Police Lose Second Stop-and-Frisk Case on Appeal, BLOOMBERG (July 3, 2012,
11:01 PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-07-03/n-y-court-tosses-second-stop-andfrisk-arrest.html, archived at http://perma.cc/24Y9-F4MP.
48
See Jeffrey Fagan & Garth Davies, Street Stops and Broken Windows: Terry, Race, and
Disorder in New York City, 28 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 457, 496–99 (2000). See generally Andrew
Gelman et al., An Analysis of the New York City Police Department’s “Stop-and-Frisk” Policy
in the Context of Claims of Racial Bias, 102 J. AM. STAT. ASS’N 813 (2007) (using data on the
frequency of police contacts to address potential issues of bias in policing).
49
See Skogan & Meares, supra note 4, at 68 (pointing out the value of police discretion to
problem-solving policing).
50
See Kahan & Meares, supra note 9, at 1169–71, 1182–83 (expressing concern about an
older regime of constitutional discretion-skepticism and advocating a more relaxed approach
to judicial review in the form of guided discretion).
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encounters that people often find troubling typically have very little to do
with the law. This is true even when people describe their negative
experiences in terms that have accumulated a legal valence. The concept of
racial profiling functions as a case study that motivates what we are trying to
convey.
Ask a lawyer what constitutes racial profiling, and she will usually
answer that racial profiling is police behavior motivated solely or even
partially by the belief that members of a particular racial group are more
likely than other people to commit a particular type of crime or crime in
general (by a “stereotype”).51 Note, too, that if racial profiling is defined in
the usual lawyerly manner, it is not racial profiling when an officer
investigates a person because his race matches information about a
perpetrator given to the police in, say, an incident report.52 Importantly, when
the problematic conduct is defined as we have just described, then the illegal
act is complete at the moment the encounter between the offending police
officer and the targeted citizen begins. The on-the-ground reality of street
encounters is not central to the legality of police actions.
In a study of the subjective experience of being profiled, as opposed to
the objective (or, in terms of this Article, legalistic) one, Tom R. Tyler and
Cheryl Wakslak show, however, that the judgments that people make about
police procedural fairness during the stop influence whether the people
dealing with the police believe they have been profiled in the first place. After
all, the police do not tell people that they stopped them due to their race or
age, so this is an inference that people must make. Those who believe police
are neutral and who feel listened to are consequently less likely to believe
they have been profiled.53 Additionally, those whose encounters with police
are characterized by respectful, polite treatment and an acknowledgement of

51

See Samuel R. Gross & Debra Livingston, Racial Profiling Under Attack, 102 COLUM.
L. REV. 1413, 1413 (2002). Gross and Livingston offer this definition:
By September 10, 2001, virtually everyone, from Jesse Jackson to Al Gore to George W. Bush to
John Ashcroft, agreed that racial profiling was very bad. We also knew what racial profiling was:
Police officers would stop, question, and search African American and Hispanic citizens
disproportionately, because of their race or ethnicity, in order to try to catch common criminals.

Id.; see also DAVID A. HARRIS, PROFILES IN INJUSTICE: WHY RACIAL PROFILING CANNOT WORK
11 (2002).
52
See Gross & Livingston, supra note 51, at 1415. But see R. Richard Banks, Race-Based
Suspect Selection and Colorblind Equal Protection Doctrine and Discourse, 48 UCLA L. REV.
1075, 1096–99 (2001) (arguing that race-based suspect selection and investigation is little
different from “classic” racial profiling in that pursuing minority suspects on the basis of
physical descriptions results is an intentional use of a racial classification by state actors that
disparately impacts innocent members of some racial minority groups).
53
See Tyler & Wakslak, supra note 27, at 259.
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their rights also are much less likely to believe they have been profiled.54
And, we hope not surprisingly at this point, those who trust the motives of
police are less likely than those who do not to believe that profiling has
occurred.55 In other words, people’s inferences about why they have been
stopped are based in large part on how they see the officers involved
exercising their authority during the stop. If the officers listen to people,
explain the basis of their actions, treat them respectfully, and acknowledge
people’s concerns in the situation, they are trusted and viewed as acting
professionally. If not, they are viewed as acting based upon animus toward
whatever potentially stigmatizable group to which the person belongs (i.e.,
age, race, gender). People do not focus on the legally relevant issue—whether
police have valid reasons for making the stop in the first place. Instead, they
react to police behavior during the stop.
This disjuncture between the subjective and the objective views of racial
profiling accords nicely with the circumstances surrounding the explosive
arrest of Professor Henry Louis Gates by a Cambridge, Massachusetts police
officer in the summer of 2010. Briefly, the facts were these: Sergeant James
Crowley radioed that he would go to the Gates residence after receiving at
12:46 p.m. on July 16, 2009, a dispatch that there was a possible breaking
and entering in progress.56 Crowley arrived to find Gates in his home, and
from there, the stories diverge. Crowley’s version of the events is that Gates
was yelling and behaving in a “tumultuous” manner as Crowley attempted to
ascertain enough facts to ensure that a crime was not occurring.57 Gates’s
view, on the other hand, was that Crowley disrespected him by failing to
respond when Gates asked him his name and badge number and for
suspecting him, a slight, elderly man with a cane, to be a burglar.58 Because
Sergeant Crowley was sent to Gates’s home in response to a 911 call, it is
difficult to characterize his decision to have an encounter with Professor
Gates as racial profiling according to the usual legalistic definition. Yet
Professor Gates has described his experience in exactly these terms.59 His

54

See id.
See id.
56
See CITY OF CAMBRIDGE, MISSED OPPORTUNITIES, SHARED RESPONSIBILITIES: FINAL
REPORT OF THE CAMBRIDGE REVIEW COMMITTEE 1 (2010), http://www.cambridgema.gov/city
ofcambridge_content/documents/cambridge%20review_final.pdf, archived at http://perma.
cc/ZCD5-GZSJ. One of this Article’s authors, Tracey Meares, served on the committee that
drafted this report.
57
Id. at 19.
58
Id. at 19–21.
59
See, e.g., David Olopade, Skip Gates Speaks, THE ROOT (July 21, 2009, 5:34 PM), http://
www.theroot.com/articles/culture/2009/07/professor_henry_louis_gates_jr_speaks_out_on_
55
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experience does not easily fit the typical legal framework, but his description
of his experience does fit well with the conception of fairness (or rather its
absence) as we have described it here.
Consider Gates’s own words, taken from the Gates Committee Report:
Gates said he asked for the officer’s name and badge number on several occasions, but
that the officer never responded or asked him if he was all right. Gates said that “the
silence was deafening.” Gates said he then said to the officer, “You’re not responding
because I am a black man and you’re a white officer.” 60

Professor Gates said he was greatly disturbed that Sergeant Crowley refused
to formally give him his name and badge number. He interpreted this refusal
as a racially motivated insult and an abuse of police power.
The point here is that regardless of the lawfulness of police behavior—
and in this case the Committee acknowledged that Sergeant Crowley was
acting legally—Professor Gates did not experience the sergeant’s actions as
fair. If Sergeant Crowley had been more willing to listen to Professor Gates,
more open to explaining the reasons for his actions, and had made an effort
to deal with an obviously upset person in a respectful and responsive manner,
the entire incident, which emerged as a national event, might well have been
avoided.
We think this incident demonstrates how a lack of procedural justice in
encounters with police can change public perceptions of policing agencies,
creating more negative perceptions that involve a lack of trust, ill will, and
ultimately, less compliance. Professor Gates was convinced that he had been
profiled. And so were many members of the public.61 The late Bill Stuntz
offered a characteristically crystalline assessment:
Fourth Amendment law devotes an enormous amount of attention to the fact of searches
and seizures, but almost none to how those searches and seizures are carried out. That
ought to be reversed; sharp legal lines between “searches” and “seizures” and
everything else ought to be replaced with hazier boundaries between decent police
behavior and the indecent kind.62

The Gates case illustrates how the experience of injustice and of
disrespect provokes anger and resistance. Even a normally mild-mannered
racial_profiling_after_his_arrest_by_cambridge_police.html, archived at http://perma.cc/
VXE2-L44D.
60
See CITY OF CAMBRIDGE, supra note 56, at 20.
61
See Susan Saulny & Robbie Brown, Case Recalls Tightrope Blacks Walk with Police,
N.Y. TIMES, July 24, 2009, at A1 (noting reactions from different people, including a professor,
a lawyer, a diversity consultant, a housing authority agent, readers on websites and blogs, and
more, all of whom concluded that some sort of racial profiling occurred).
62
See William J. Stuntz, Local Policing After the Terror, 111 YALE L.J. 2137, 2141
(2002).
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Harvard professor can become enraged when he feels that he is being
disrespected. And if a person whose status in society is secure and validated
by membership in an elite institution can feel that his status and identity are
being undermined by a police officer’s unresponsiveness and lack of
explanation, imagine how a young minority male feels when he is stopped
and frisked by police on the street. These young males are well aware that no
Cambridge Commission will investigate their complaints of harassment and
injustice on the street.
The Gates incident is hardly atypical. Irrespective of whether street
stops are legal or good police policy, what young people typically complain
about is how they are treated by police officers during stops.63 Complaints
include disrespect, use of ethnic slurs, physical intimidation, and a variety of
other types of procedural injustice. These actions convey a negative social
message, a message of negative identity, and marginal status.64
The key to mapping our insights onto the ways that the public (as
Ordinary Observers) and police (as Scientific Policymakers) evaluate the
rightfulness of police action is to separate out two dimensions: lawfulness
and procedural justice. In terms of lawfulness, the police should not
undertake to arrest citizens (or even stop them) unless a statute or ordinance
indicates that the conduct in question is unlawful. They should not move to
arrest or engage a person unless they have gathered enough facts to constitute
the constitutionally required level of suspicion that the Fourth Amendment
specifies. Once an encounter has begun, an officer should endeavor to follow
every state statute, city ordinance, and general order (administrative rule)
relevant to the specific context.
Separately, when the police act according to procedural justice
principles, they comport themselves in ways that confer dignity on those with
whom they interact and, more broadly, treat people with respect. Examples
here include high-quality interpersonal treatment,65 offering citizens an
opportunity to tell their side of the story during an encounter,66 being
63
See Wendy Ruderman, Rude or Polite, City’s Officers Leave Raw Feelings in Stops,
N.Y. TIMES, June 27, 2012, at A1.
64
For ethnographic accounts of the experiences of young men of color during encounters
with policing detailing such complaints, see Rod K. Brunson, “Police Don’t Like Black
People”: African-American Young Men’s Accumulated Police Experiences, 6 CRIMINOLOGY
& PUB. POL’Y 71 (2007); Jacinta M. Gau & Rod K. Brunson, Procedural Justice and Order
Maintenance Policing: A Study of Inner-City Young Men’s Perceptions of Police Legitimacy,
27 JUSTICE Q. 255 (2010); Carmen Solis et al., Latino Youths’ Experiences with and
Perceptions of Involuntary Police Encounters, 623 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 39
(2009).
65
See Tyler & Fagan, supra note 37, at 239; Tyler & Wakslak, supra note 27, at 278.
66
See TYLER & HUO, supra note 16, at 14.
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transparent about the reasons for the encounter, and explaining in advance
what will happen during the encounter, thereby raising the probability that a
citizen will conclude that the officer’s decisions are fact-based and neutral,
rather than arbitrary.67
Putting the two parts together, we see that the best way for the police to
behave is to be both lawful and procedurally just.68 That is where one will
find rightful policing.69 We believe that a potential primary problem with
street policing in urban cities, such as New York and Philadelphia, is that
these cities exhibit examples of police conduct that is very likely objectively
lawful but is also perceived by the citizen on the other side of the encounter
as deeply, deeply unfair, using the term in the way we have defined it here.70
If we are right, then it means that any attempted strategy to both describe and
remedy a problem that exists in multiple dimensions will fail if the proposed
strategy is one dimensional and considers either of these two dimensions
alone.
We argue that this is the fundamental problem with the law-based
approach to policing. The constitutional criminal procedure as it is written
67

Cf. Tyler & Wakslak, supra note 27, at 278.
It should be obvious that these two dimensions are not completely orthogonal to one
another. Consider that one of the procedural justice dimensions, concern for dignity and rights,
clearly implicates notions of lawfulness. Thus, there is likely some interaction among
characteristics. The important point is to see that law—certainly as it stands today and possibly
as it develops in the future—cannot capture all aspects of procedural justice. One suspects that
legislated politeness, for example, ceases to be such. And to the extent that the dimensions
capture different aspects of what people care about, the disjuncture that we describe here will
continue to exist.
69
Meares provides an illustrative “compass” detailing four quadrants of police action:
Lawful and procedurally just in the northeast, lawful but procedurally unjust in the southeast,
unlawful and procedurally unjust in the southwest, and, finally, unlawful but procedurally just
in the northwest. See Meares, supra note 15, at 1878–79.
70
There recently has been litigation in both Philadelphia and in New York based on the
assertion that many of the police stops in New York City and Philadelphia are, in fact, unlawful
under our terms, as opposed to lawful but procedurally unjust. See Sean Gardiner, Judge Reins
in Frisking by Police, WALL ST. J., Aug. 13, 2013, at A1; Patrick Walter, Philadelphia Police
Are Sued over ‘Stop and Frisk’, WASH. POST, Nov. 5, 2010, at A3; Joel Mathis, New Lawsuit
Challenges Credibility of Notorious Police Drug Unit, “Stop and Frisk” Policy, PHILA. MAG.
(July 18, 2013), http://www.phillymag.com/news/2013/07/18/lawsuit-challenges-phillypolice-stop-frisk-tactics, archived at http://perma.cc/FA5V-HTJ6; Justin Peters, The Worst of
Stop-and-Frisk Is Over. But Why Didn’t the NYPD End the Racist Policy Itself?, SLATE (Aug.
12, 2013, 4:57PM), http://www.slate.com/blogs/crime/2013/08/12/stop_and_frisk_ruling_
judge_shira_scheindlin_s_decision_in_floyd_v_city.html, archived at http://perma.cc/5D
WV-Q85Q. We do not mean to gloss over this issue. Rather, we simply want to point out that
it is likely that even if both cities are outliers compared to others regarding the lawfulness of
the street encounters there, it remains true that the vast majority of the street stops in these two
cities are lawful. And yet citizens still are dissatisfied.
68
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today has no capacity to tell police how to arrest or stop someone in a way
that will tend to support procedural fairness and will lead those involved, as
well as observers, to view police actions as legal, appropriate, and reasonable.
There is nothing in law that says that officers have to treat members of the
public in ways that they will experience as reflecting the just exercise of
authority. More than this, police are rarely trained in the ways they should
act to achieve these goals. Instead, rookie police officers spend hours and
hours reading law and learning when they are legally allowed to stop, arrest,
and search.71 They are not correspondingly trained about how to conduct
themselves so as to create and maintain their legitimacy in the community.
III. SUPPORTING OUR MODEL EMPIRICALLY
This Part describes an experimental survey designed to explore citizen
assessments of police conduct and engagement with other citizens with
reference to these dimensions. We are concerned with public evaluations of
the lawfulness of and the potential need to sanction police actions in several
interactions between police officers and members of the public. While there
are a variety of concerns that might be relevant in police–citizen encounters
(e.g., public deterrence, resistance or conflict, impact upon legitimacy), we
focus on one that is central to many after an interaction when they may
question the behavior of the police: did the police act in ways that were
lawful, appropriate, and reasonable? And, as a correlate, should the officers
involved be sanctioned?
In addition to demonstrating that public perceptions of the procedural
justice of police conduct (as well as perceptions of lawfulness itself) do not
line up with lawfulness of police behavior as a lawyer would assess it, we
also demonstrate another interesting finding. Police officers often find
themselves in the “off diagonals,” where their conduct is lawful and
procedurally unjust, or its opposite—procedurally just and unlawful.72 We
contend that when given a choice, the public would prefer police to be
procedurally just and unlawful as opposed to lawful and procedurally unjust.
This finding should be unsurprising given the theory we have reviewed thus

71
We canvassed several policing agencies across the country, including the departments
in Boston, Chicago, New Haven, and San Francisco. According to personnel with whom we
spoke in these departments, the number of hours rookies spend learning the law ranges from
a high of 258 hours out of 1040 hours of total training in Boston (approximately 25% of
training) to 98 hours out of a total 1184 hours of total training in San Francisco (just over 8%
of the total training hours).
72
See supra note 69 for an explanation of the four potential positions; see also Meares,
supra note 15, at 1879 for an illustrative figure.
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far. And yet, it is no doubt unsettling to many. After reviewing the results of
our study, we offer what we hope are (somewhat) comforting conclusions.
A. STUDY DESIGN

To address the issues raised, a nationwide study of the influence of
lawfulness and procedural justice on how the public judges the
appropriateness of police conduct and the need to discipline police officers
was conducted in March 2008. The goal was to improve our ability to identify
key factors influencing public views about when police conduct is
appropriate or inappropriate. Through the unraveling of interconnected
individual, contextual, and situational factors, we sought to enhance our
understanding of the salient pathways through which citizens make
judgments about the appropriateness of police actions.
This study used two different components to assess the influence of
demographic, experiential, situational, and contextual factors on citizens’
perceptions and evaluations of police actions. One component was a
questionnaire that measured factors we hypothesized would influence how
citizens perceive and evaluate police–citizen encounters, such as their prior
experiences with police, whether they were crime victims, their political
commitments, etc.
The second component was an experimental design that tested how
citizens perceived and evaluated these types of encounters when they
experienced them through manipulated vignettes that combined actual videos
of police–citizen interactions with background information that the
respondents read prior to viewing the videotapes. In other words, the videos
were framed for the respondents within prior information about the encounter
they viewed.
The study used a multipart design to examine the factors shaping
people’s perceptions about police authority. First, every respondent was
asked about their past experience and prior views about police and the
influence of those priors were examined. Second, the social context
surrounding the videos was varied along several dimensions, including the
history of policing in the city in which the videos occurred and the history of
the people involved in those videos, and the impact of context was evaluated.
Third, the influence of varying social position (e.g., age, race, gender,
income, etc.) was considered. And, finally the influence of the videos
(presented in random order) was assessed.73
73

A critical feature of the study was to vary the order in which respondents completed
these components. That is, one half of the respondents completed the questionnaire first, and
the other half completed the experimental component first. Given the large sample (1361
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The experimental component of the study leveraged video footage of
actual police–citizen interactions. Specifically, our respondents viewed three
videos in random order. In each video the police exercised some level of
authority over the person stopped, ranging from verbal commands to the use
of physical force. Respondents could determine whether the police actions
they observed were lawful from details in the fact patterns we provided for
them before they viewed the videotapes. However, respondents never were
told, “The police acted lawfully in the video you are about see.” For example,
respondents were told prior to viewing a video that the officers stopped
someone because he was driving “erratically,” as opposed to “while he was
driving appropriately and within the speed limit.” Respondents received fact
patterns comprising one of three conditions: the police acted lawfully, the
police acted unlawfully, or ambiguous information about police lawfulness.
After they viewed the videotapes, we asked respondents to evaluate the
procedural justice of the police actions—for example, did the police listen to
the person stopped? Did the police act neutrally? Were the police respectful,
etc.? To conduct the analyses, we split respondents into two groups by
dividing them at the mean into high and low procedural justice groups
through a process we explain in detail below. Finally, we asked respondents
to evaluate whether the police had acted illegally and whether they should be
punished.
The questionnaire is outlined in Appendix A. The experimental design
is outlined in Appendix B. The sample is discussed in Appendix C.
B. RESULTS
1. Comparing Lawfulness and Procedural Justice
We first utilized the nonexperimental results from our data to attempt to
assess the factors that impact when a respondent who had an actual
experience with a police officer would consider complaining about that
officer’s conduct. A sample of 2183 respondents completed the
nonexperimental questionnaire. Of those, 54% (1170) indicated having had
a recent experience with the police. Of those, 25% had been stopped, 32%
had called for help, 17% had called to file a complaint, and 26% had dealt
with the police for other reasons. For complete information about this portion
of the study, see Appendix A.

participants), this allowed us to assess whether respondents who completed the questionnaire
first were primed by exposure to questions that might have influenced their vignette
evaluations in the experimental component.
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Those respondents who dealt with the police were asked questions
corresponding to the issues addressed in this study. First, they were asked
whether they had received the “outcome they deserved according to the law.”
Eighty-two percent indicated that they had. They were then asked to rate the
justice of their treatment by the police using a four-item scale. The items
were: “police made decisions based on the facts” (86% agreed), “police cared
about my concerns” (79% agreed), “police treated me politely” (91% agreed),
and “police respected my rights” (91% agreed). Finally, they were asked
whether they had considered complaining about the police, and 25%
indicated that they had.
Our concern is with the factors shaping the belief that the police had
engaged in inappropriate conduct about which they should complain. To
examine this question we conducted a regression analysis considering the
influence of perceived lawfulness and procedural justice of treatment on
whether people considered complaining, controlled for race, age, and gender.
We found that judgments about the procedural justice of police treatment
shaped complaining decisions (β = 0.40, p < .001), but judgments about
perceived legality did not (β = 0.06, n.s.). Demographic characteristics such
as race, gender, and age have little influence upon whether people considered
complaining.
While our central interest is in examining whether our experimental
analysis indicates that people do not attend to the legality of police conduct;
however, these nonexperimental findings provide an initial suggestion that
“legality” may be an overrated framework for understanding public
discontent. Therefore, this initial analysis sets the stage for consideration of
our findings from the experimental portion of our research design by
suggesting that legality may not be as important to members of the public
making assessments of police actions as police official and legal scholars
assume it is. Our data suggest perceived legality does not shape people’s
reactions to their own police encounters.
While provocative, this finding has several limits. First, it is focused on
the outcome of an encounter rather than the initial reasons for the encounter.
Analysis of lawfulness of police decisions places an emphasis on whether the
police had justification for dealing with the person in the first place. Second,
in this first assessment of the data, we looked to how respondents perceived
the lawfulness of their encounters. Obviously, police are not in a position to
know if their behavior will be experienced as lawful by the people they deal
with. Rather, they need to know whether people will respond differently
based upon whether police follow the objectively correct legal actions about
which they are aware and have been trained. For this reason, we designed an
experiment that presents fact patterns that conform to or depart from legal
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police conduct by providing respondents an opportunity to assess relevant
facts about which an officer would be aware before deciding to engage a
person.
A primary goal of the experimental part of our study was to determine
how the actual lawfulness of a stop and people’s perceptions of the
procedural justice of police behavior during the stop influenced both their
perceptions of lawfulness and their desire to punish the police officers for the
conduct they observed in the videos. To do this, we used videotapes of
police–citizen interactions so that we could present our respondents with the
same event, but experimentally vary the fact pattern that framed that event.
It is only through such an approach that we can clearly establish the influence
of the legality of officer actions upon people’s evaluations of the
subsequently occurring interaction.
To effectively compare lawfulness evaluations and those based on
procedural justice in the experimental part of the study, we needed to group
our respondents into cells of a two-by-two chart: (1) those who witnessed a
lawful arrest/stop and believed there to be a high level of procedural justice;
(2) those who witnessed a lawful arrest/stop and believed there to be a low
level of procedural justice; (3) those who witnessed an unlawful arrest/stop
and believed there to be a high level of procedural justice; and (4) those who
witnessed an unlawful arrest/stop and believed there to be a low level of
procedural justice. We then had to calculate the average desire of each group
to punish the police officers involved.
Table 1
Comparing Lawfulness and Procedural Justice Evaluations

Lawfulness of
Unlawful
Lawful

Perceived Procedural Justice
High
Low
(2) Respondents who
(1) Respondents who
witnessed a lawful
witnessed a lawful
arrest/stop and believed arrest/stop but believed
there to be a high level of there to be a low level of
procedural justice.
procedural justice.
(4) Respondents who
(3) Respondents who
witnessed an unlawful
witnessed an unlawful
arrest/stop but believed arrest/stop and believed
there to be a high level of there to be a low level of
procedural justice.
procedural justice.
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Thanks to our experimental design, separating those respondents who
witnessed an actually lawful arrest/stop from those who witnessed an
unlawful arrest/stop was simple: we merely looked at the contextual
description provided for each video. As we noted above, one third of
respondents were given contextual descriptions that framed the arrest/stop as
lawful, and one third were given contextual descriptions that framed the
arrest/stop as unlawful. The other third were given ambiguous descriptions
and were therefore ignored in our analysis.74
Separating those respondents who believed there to be a high level of
procedural justice from those who believed there to be a low level of
procedural justice was slightly more complicated. We calculated the extent
to which respondents perceived the police behavior to be procedurally just.
We did this by looking at how much they agreed or disagreed with the
following six statements:
 “The police made decisions about what to do in fair ways”;
 “The police allowed the citizen to express his views before
making decisions”;
 “The police got the information about the situation needed to
make good decisions”;
 “The police explained the decisions they made”;
 “The police treated the citizen with respect and dignity”; and
 “The police showed concern for the citizen’s rights.”
Respondents rated their level of agreement with these statements on a scale
of 1 to 5, with 1 being “strongly disagree,” 2 being “disagree,” 3 being
“neither agree nor disagree,” 4 being “agree,” and 5 being “strongly agree.”
We split the group in half at the mean. Those above the mean became our
high procedural justice group, and those below the mean became the low
group.
Finally, after dividing respondents into the necessary four groups
(lawful/high procedural justice; lawful/low procedural justice; unlawful/high
procedural justice; unlawful/low procedural justice), we then measured their
views about whether police had acted unlawfully. The response options were:
 “The police officers violated the law”;
 “The police officers engaged in serious misconduct”; and
74 These contextual frames were developed by one of us. The respondents were not
specifically told whether the facts constituted constitutionality in each case. Rather, they were
given facts to review that would lead any lawyer (or budding lawyer) to confidently make a
conclusion regarding constitutionality (or not).
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“The behavior of the police officers was atypical of police
actions in a situation of this type.”
We also measured the desire to punish the police. To accomplish this,
we analyzed on a five-point scale how they rated the following three
statements:
 “The officers involved should be reprimanded or punished in
some way”;
 “These officers should be put in jobs in which they do not patrol
the streets”; and
 “It would be appropriate for the person involved to sue the
police.”
The judgments of illegality and desire to sanction were highly correlated
(r = 0.76), so they were combined into a single overall judgment for the
purposes of our analysis.
2. When Is Illegality Perceived and Why Punish the Police?
The best way to think about differences among groups is to divide
people up in the two ways we outline above: (1) is the conduct lawful or
unlawful, and (2) do the people feel that the police acted justly or unjustly?
The average level of perceived illegality or punishment or both suggested for
police can then be assessed within each group. Figure 1 shows such an
analysis that results from the three videos.75

75

The numbers shown combine all three videos. There were three lawful conditions
(lawful, unlawful, no information), and only the lawful and unlawful means are shown. The
perceived procedural justice scale was divided at the mean to form two categories. High scores
indicate a strong desire to punish the officers involved. The scale runs from 1 to 5. The entries
are the mean for each group.
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Figure 1
Mean Level of Perceived Illegality, Desire to Punish Police, or Both
Uneven force

High force

Low force

Overall

2.4
2.2
2
1.8
1.6
1.4
1.2
1
Lawful, Fair

Unlawful, Fair

Lawful, Unfair Unlawful, Unfair

In this graph, the rating moves closer to five as the respondents’ view
that illegality occurred or preference for punishment or both increases. The
graph demonstrates clearly that procedural justice is a major factor in that
determination. When procedural justice is high, lawlessness judgments and
punishment preferences are almost one full point higher than they are when
procedural justice is low. In contrast, the distinction between the lawfulness
conditions barely registers.
3. Multilevel Modeling
The analysis outlined suggests that people’s belief that illegal behavior
has occurred and their desire to punish police derives from whether police act
with procedural justice. The objective lawfulness of police actions is
secondary. While we present these findings using simple statistics, it is
possible to perform this analysis in a statistically more complex way that
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considers possible confounding factors, such as race, gender, class, and
education level.
The appropriate analysis is multilevel modeling, taking account of the
fact that each respondent rated three videotapes.76 We conducted such an
analysis, and the results are consistent with our argument. The model first
takes account of the multilevel nature of the data. It further controls for prior
attitudes toward and experiences with police, including identification with
the police and the nature of police actions during prior personal contacts.
The results of the multilevel model support the conclusions we have
already outlined. This analysis was conducted in two ways: first, without
controls for demographic characteristics and for prior views (column one),
and second, with such statistical controls in place (column two).
A belief that illegal action occurred or a motivation to punish the police
or both is linked primarily to the procedural justice of police actions
(regression coefficient = 0.68 (standard error = 0.03), t(796) = 26.06,
P < .001). There is no statistically significant connection between the
unlawfulness of police action and the desire for punishment (regression
coefficient = -.04 (standard error = 0.04), t(1067) = 0.81, n.s.). Because these
results are found in an analysis with appropriate controls, the findings
outlined are robust and are not the result of respondents’ prior views about
police.

76
Multilevel modeling is a statistical technique that simultaneously considers individualand group-level effects. So, for example, it is possible to consider the opinions of people,
taking account of what country they live in. In this case, the analysis considers the participants’
opinions while taking account of which of the three videotapes they are reacting to.
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Figure 2
Multilevel Modeling of Police Punishment Judgments
No controls
Intercept

Controls

1.74(0.09)

t(1979)=19.61***

1.40(0.43)

t(1092)=3.28***

Confused vs.
Rude

0.03(0.04)

t(1331)=0.80

0.01(0.04)

t(738)= 0.30

Aggressive vs.
Rude

-.24(0.04)

t(1374)=5.84***

-.26(0.05)

t(796)=5.57***

Lawful Police
Action

-.03(0d.04)

t(1942)=0.84

-.02(0.04)

t(1093)=0.51

Unlawful
Police Action

-.02(0.04)

t(1928)=0.53

-.04(0.04)

t(1067)=0.81

0.72(0.02)

t(1900)=36.38***

0.68(0.03)

t(796)=26.06***

Video Watched

Context

Procedural
Justice
Procedural
Justice of
Police Actions

p< .05; **p < .01; ***p < .001.

Multilevel modeling was used (SPSS mixed procedure). Each
respondent provided three evaluations, one for each video watched, and this
procedure controlled for respondent effects. Controls were made for prior
identification, political ideology, prior experience with police (outcomes and
procedural justice), whether the person was a victim of crime, his or her fear
of crime, neighborhood conditions, political efficacy, the fairness of
government policies, and the willingness to let police use force.
4. Path Modeling
Because the post-video questions (e.g., procedural justice, police
lawfulness, desire to punish the police) were all answered at one point in
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time, we have followed the conservative strategy of treating the variables
separately in our analysis and not assuming any particular causal order
among them. However, using path modeling allows us to explore the
relationship among variables. In particular, we can develop a more nuanced
model of legality.
In presenting the issue that frames this Article, we contrasted two
concerns: whether police actions are actually lawful and whether police are
acting in procedurally just ways. Figure 3 shows the effects that would be
expected under each model. If people focus solely on actual lawfulness, then
the fact patterns indicating lawfulness or unlawfulness should impact public
views about culpability and sanctioning. If the procedural justice model is
correct, it should be the demeanor and comportment of police officers (i.e.,
whether they acted fairly) that shapes culpability and sanctioning.
Figure 3
Conceptual Models

Model One: Lawfulness
Police actions
were legal.

Police actions
were not legal.

Public views the police as
culpable in wrongdoing;
supports sanctions.

Model Two: Procedural Justice
Police behaved
fairly.

Police behaved
unfairly.

Public views the police as
culpable in wrongdoing;
supports sanctions.

Our empirical findings suggest that respondents have very little
sensitivity to questions of actual police lawfulness. However, there is an
alternative model that we can evaluate. That model is that the public cares
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about perceived lawfulness, but that perceived lawfulness is not strongly
linked to actual lawfulness.
Our argument is that people do care about lawfulness, but they base their
understanding of lawfulness on police procedural justice. We noted that
people who are treated fairly are less likely to infer that the police have
profiled them. Hence, the public potentially takes account of the legality of
police behavior but infers it from police conduct. In other words, police
actions shape public views, not whether their behavior is legal. This is
consistent with the suggestion that behaviors in certain situations are highly
salient, while contextual legality is in the background and is typically
underweighted. We can test this idea through a path model.
In the path analysis, we test the argument that people’s perceptions of
the lawfulness and procedural justice of police conduct potentially influence
their assessments of the wrongfulness of police behavior, which in turn
influences their conclusions about whether police should be punished. These
are causal claims, and the data is correlational. However, the reasonableness
of this causal order is based upon the psychological literature on perception,
evaluation, and blame assessment.77 Drawing upon that literature, we suggest
that it is reasonable to view the causal order as flowing from evaluations of
procedural justice and through them to assessments of blame78 and then
punishment.
The results of the path model are shown in Figure 4. The solid lines
indicate significant paths, and dashed lines indicate no significant
connection. The numbers associated with each one reflect the strength of the
influence (i.e., the standardized regression coefficient). Consistent with our
assumptions, the key antecedent of wanting to punish police is viewing their
actions as culpable (i.e., legally wrong). It is this judgment that is central to
punishment. Hence, the public is not indifferent to issues of legality. Clearly,
people believe actions judged to be illegal should be punished.

77
The literature is quite voluminous, but for two pieces that summarize it in a
straightforward way, see Mark D. Alicke, Culpable Causation, 63 J. PERSONALITY & SOC.
PSYCHOL. 368 (1992); Mark D. Alicke, Culpable Control and the Psychology of Blame,
126 PSYCHOL. BULL. 556 (2000).
78
Culpability was measured using three items: “The police violated the law”; “The police
officers engaged in serious misconduct”; and “The behavior of the police was reasonable and
fair.”
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Figure 4
Path Model
78%
Police actions
were legal.

Police actions
were not legal.

Police
should be
sanctioned.
0.86

0.05

Police
behaved
unlawfully.

50%

-.71

-.10
Police
behaved
fairly.

But perceived illegality is directly responsive to procedural justice, not
to actual lawfulness. In other words, people are at best weakly influenced by
actual legality. It is perceived legality that is central to punishment. It turns
out, though, that perceived legality is based primarily upon procedural justice
and not actual legality. If police are using fair procedures, people will infer
that their actions are legal.
This does not mean, however, that actual legality is irrelevant. As is
shown in Figure 4, one factor that people consider when evaluating the
overall fairness of police actions is whether police acted illegally, with illegal
conduct lowering perceptions that police acted using fair procedures. In other
words, if people know before they view the video that the initial contact was
not legal, they are less likely to interpret police actions as procedurally fair.
This influence is small but clear and statistically significant.79
79

This model does not include prior views about police, but if they are included, the
analysis further supports the suggestion that antecedent values shape people’s evaluations of
events. When people make judgments about the procedural justice of police conduct, they
consider many factors, including whether police behaved lawfully. This is not surprising,
because as Dan Kahan and his coauthors suggest, values shape perceptions of the facts, as well
as evaluations of the actions of legal actors. See, e.g., Dan M. Kahan et al., Whose Eyes Are
You Going to Believe? Scott v. Harris and the Perils of Cognitive Illiberalism, 122 HARV. L.
REV. 837 (2009). Judgments about police are additionally shaped by people’s prior level of
identification with police and their overall political–social ideology (factors taken into account
in the analysis shown in Figure 4). These prior values directly influence procedural justice
judgments and evaluations of police wrongdoing, and prior ideology also directly shapes
judgments about whether police should be punished. Hence, people’s reactions to events are
not only a function of what happens within those events. They also have an already-developed
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The path results reinforce the results of the multilevel modeling analysis
in suggesting that, while many factors matter, the primary factor shaping
lawfulness assessments was the procedural justice evaluation. Once such
procedural justice judgments are taken into account, the objective legality of
police actions has no direct influence upon lawfulness assessments.
However, this does not mean that illegal actions have no consequences.
Officers who were presented as acting illegally were judged to have used
procedures that were less fair, leading to judgments of wrongdoing and a
heightened desire to punish.
While these path results help us to gain a better understanding of the
nature of people’s reactions to videos of police–citizen interactions, we
caution that because the data upon which they are based are cross-sectional,
they must be viewed as tentative. On the other hand, the experimental
variations in objective lawfulness clearly suggest that when people have a
prior understanding that police are acting in ways that the law defines as legal
or illegal, this has little impact upon whether they are perceived as acting
legally, whether they should be sanctioned, or both.
IV. IMPLICATIONS
The data confirms our core claim: when assessing the legality of police
actions, procedural justice factors are more influential to people’s judgments
than the actual legality of police behavior. Or, to put it somewhat
provocatively, although the lawfulness of police conduct has some effect on
the public’s desire to punish police, this effect is trivial compared to that of
procedural justice. It is what police do during a stop that shapes perceived
lawfulness, not the reasons on which they rely when deciding to engage a
person. Additionally, of the many aspects of police behavior that might
matter, what does matter is procedural justice.
What should we make of this? We think at least three points are
important.
First. People’s ordinary intuitions about rightful police behavior do not
comport with the law. That is, people do not seem to care very much at all
about police adherence to constitutional rules when assessing whether police
should be punished. They care instead primarily about the procedural justice
and fairness of the way police act when dealing with people in the
community. This could result from at least two conditions. The first condition
value system that shapes event perception and evaluation. These other factors were controlled
for in the multilevel analysis. For an examination of such fact-centered influences, see
Anthony Braga et al., The Salience of Social Context Factors in Appraisals of Police
Interactions with Citizens: A Randomized Factorial Experiment, 30 J. QUANTITATIVE
CRIMINOLOGY 599 (2014).

1 Meares-Tyler (final to printer) -- 7/19/2016

334

MEARES, TYLER & GARDENER

[Vol. 105

is one in which people are aware both of legality and fairness factors but
consciously choose to credit fairness over legality. A second condition is one
in which people choose fairness over legality because they are unaware of,
or perhaps more precisely, untutored in, legality. If this second condition
holds, then we would expect people’s assessments of legality and fairness to
be coextensive. To put this point another way, people rely on fairness to
evaluate police conduct because they do not know the law. As best we can
tell, the second condition is a better descriptor of our data.80 In our data,
people did not put great weight on comparing the facts of the situation to the
legal rules that dictated appropriate police conduct in the situations they
observed. Instead, they assessed police behavior with reference to their
procedural justice judgments.
The central point these findings support is the disjuncture between the
authorities, who examine a situation through a prism of law when trying to
decide what types of actions are appropriate, and the members of the public,
who make judgments regarding law by analyzing the behaviors that police
officers engage in during their interactions with them well after legal
authorities have decided to act. Each party to the situation focuses upon the
time point that is most salient to them based upon the issues that they care
about. Law enforcement agents bring a framework of legal rules and
categories to a decision point at which they classify the facts into what is
needed to make a lawful judgment. Their concern is whether conduct
comports with the law. The public reacts to intrusion of a state authority into
their lives by trying to understand the meaning of police actions for them. In
particular, they seek clues about the social meaning of police behavior—e.g.,
messages about their status and standing in their community; the rights that
will be accorded to them; whether officers appear to be trustworthy,
benevolent, and sincere; whether officers are trying to do what is right; and
whether they are trying to consider the person’s needs and concerns. These
questions are at best peripherally addressed by the legality of conduct but are
strongly influenced by how officers exercise their authority in the situation.
Second. Suggesting that people “know” fairness and not the law means,
we think, that it is extremely important to separate lawfulness from
unlawfulness on the one hand and fairness and unfairness on the other, while
specifying a relationship between them as we do in the model presented
above. Perhaps the most important reason to do this is that police are
creatures of law and are trained in that law. Police, unlike some members of

80

The key point here is that actual legality has no impact upon perceived legality. Whether
police are actually following the law is not central to whether the public perceived them to be
acting legally.
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the public, are not everyday lawyers, but, rather, experts.81 They strive to
conform their behavior to a set of norms and scripts heavily influenced by
formal law.
As we noted earlier, the efforts of police to adhere to the law can leave
the police confused about problems with public legitimacy. Trained from a
legal framework, officers naturally infer that because they follow the law,
their actions are legal and, more importantly, legitimate. If lawful action is
legitimate action, it follows to a police officer that people should defer to her
authority and not question her actions. Yet studies of the public reveal
widespread perceptions of illegitimacy and suggest that efforts by police to
be more professional in their conduct (defined in terms of greater adherence
to the law) do not promote legitimacy within the community.82
We suggest that effectively addressing issues of popular legitimacy
requires police to expand the framework within which they understand their
conduct. It requires them to include within their concerns both being lawful
and being perceived by the public as acting fairly. This, then, means one
concern governs officers’ decisions about when to take action, and a second
concern governs their decisions about what to do when they implement
actions involving the public. A focus on either of these issues alone is
incomplete. The bifurcation we see on the spectrum of evaluations that
ordinary people make regarding police behavior represents a social–
psychological disjuncture in police–citizen engagement that is damaging to
citizens, counterproductive for policing agencies, and ultimately inconsistent
with the police accountability project that is critical to so many cities today.
One way to respond to the fact that citizens are unaware of the law is to
educate them about constitutional law in the hope that they may comport their
internal assessment processes in ways that are much more consistent with
that law. As we noted, authors such as Haney have advocated such a strategy
81
Here, it is useful to reprise Bruce Ackerman’s contrasting categories of legal reasoning.
His “Ordinary Observers” rely upon common practices and basic social expectations among
members of society when judging individual situations, without regard to whether those
judgments fit into a coherent pattern, and his “Scientific Policymakers” craft rules to realize
particular goals. The goals of constitutional law, while coherent, simply do not match the
expectations of well-socialized citizens, who, motivated by the social psychology of group
membership, place value on interactions that confer them status. See ACKERMAN, supra note
14, at 1–40.
82
To see this result, compare PEFFLEY, supra note 12, with research demonstrating that
police conduct has become more consistent with legal dictates when measured by lower levels
of lethal force, physically coercive confessions, and the like become more legal over time.
Peffley shows that there is a profound lack of confidence among minority groups in police,
even while police seem to be improving along the legality dimension. For a summary of
research about police compliance with law, see FAIRNESS AND EFFECTIVENESS IN POLICING,
supra note 13, at 252–90.
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as part of a general effort to increase sensitivity to situational issues.83 We
believe that this strategy is unlikely to be effective. The resources involved
would be enormous. In addition, it flies in the face of human psychology in
two ways. First, in the situation itself, people focus on the salient factor,
which is officers’ behavior, and ignore background situational factors. As we
noted above, this is consistent with research findings on fundamental
attribution error, indicating a general tendency to ignore background
information. Second, in terms of their concerns, people’s focus on officer
behavior is natural because the behavior of authorities provides information
about their identity and status. Politeness and respect affirm status, and this
is a central issue in interactions with authorities, as the procedural justice
research indicates.
Constitutional law, as it is currently composed, does not emphasize the
importance of quality of police treatment and does not discuss impact upon
dignity, identity, or status. Instead, whether a typical discretionary police
action, such as a stop or arrest, is constitutional depends upon the officer’s
observations of the potential suspect’s behavior and actions, which, when
evaluated in light of the officer’s experiences, lead her to conclude with the
constitutionally required level of certainty that the suspect has committed or
is about to commit a crime.84 Thus, the constitutionality of many police
actions is centered on what the officers know before they exercise their
discretion to engage someone. The values that the law protects are not those
that ordinary folks, at least in this area, regularly look to when constructing
individual or group identity, as decades of social psychology make clear.
Nothing about constitutional law prohibits a police officer from being rude,
and very little of constitutional criminal procedure promotes the kinds of
dignity concerns that people tend to care about. In fact, constitutional law,
because it places so much emphasis on police suspicion, is potentially at odds
with concerns about human dignity.85 When police deal with people in the
community, their legal framing encourages them to look at people as
potentially engaged in “suspicious” activity. It is identifying signs of such
activity that justifies police officer intervention into people’s lives. Hence,
when people deal with police, their experiences are tinged with mistrust and

83

See supra notes 19–21.
See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1967) (basing the ruling upon the facts the officer saw
before he acted).
85
See, e.g., Tracey L. Meares, The Distribution of Dignity and the Fourth Amendment, in
THE POLITICAL HEART OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 123, 123–29 (Michael Klarman et al. eds.,
2012) (suggesting that the Fourth Amendment’s suspicion requirement encourages police
officers to invest in confrontational attitudes toward suspects in ways that are inconsistent with
promoting procedural justice).
84
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a potentially demeaning tone. Police already suspect those they deal with are
“up to no good,” and they adopt the tone of inquisitors to gather data in
support of these suspicions.
One possible reform strategy is to advocate change in the legal rules that
shape police conduct—perhaps along the lines that Stuntz has suggested.86
We worry that this approach is an exercise in futility. Thus, we may be better
served by educating police officers about procedural justice. Police officers
need to comport their behavior with constitutional rules, yes, but they also
need to be encouraged to treat people with dignity and respect regardless of
whether the rules require it.
Why would police do this? As we have noted, popular legitimacy carries
a number of benefits for police. It promotes rule following and deference to
police decisions. It lowers resistance and conflict. It motivates cooperation.
And, as this Article shows, it leads people to view police decisions about
discretionary actions as lawful and to support sanctioning police officers less
often. Hence, treating people fairly is good police policy.
Moreover, as the creation and consumption of videos depicting police
activity continues to increase, so does the importance of procedural justice.
Indeed, cell phones and police body cameras are capturing a growing volume
of police–citizen encounters, and such footage is reaching an ever-expanding
audience online. Therefore, a police officer’s conduct has the power to shape
perceptions of police legitimacy and convey messages of respect, or a lack
thereof, far beyond those with whom she directly interacts. And because
videos of police–citizen encounters are limited in their ability to convey the
precise circumstances leading up to the encounters, the lawfulness of the
police conduct becomes even less salient to the public than it might otherwise
be.
Third. The finding that the approach we have outlined likely leads to
safer streets is only one of its benefits. As British legal scholar Neil Walker
notes, “[t]he police . . . are both minders and reminders of community—
producer[s] of significant messages about the kind of place that community
is or aspires to be.”87 Taking Walker seriously promotes an understanding of
the policing enterprise that is different from the usual conception that
emphasizes the solution of collective action problems, which in turn
emphasizes the role of police primarily as crime control agents. We do not
86

See generally WILLIAM J. STUNTZ, THE COLLAPSE OF AMERICAN CRIMINAL JUSTICE
(2011) (arguing for less discretion on the part of legal authorities and a more central role for
local juries in making decisions as an alternative).
87
Ian Loader, Policing, Recognition, and Belonging, 605 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC.
SCI. 202, 211 (2006) (citing Neil Walker, Policing and the Supranational, 12 POLICING &
SOC’Y 307, 315 (2002)).
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doubt the positive benefits resulting from policing agencies casting
themselves as necessary utilities for producing safe, functioning
communities—akin to public utilities for well-lit streets, clean water, and
cheap, widely available electricity. One must be careful in making the public
utility analogy, however. A consequential conception of a public good, which
the utility analogy clearly is, conceives of the good’s production as one that
can be enjoyed by individuals and aggregated up, so to speak. Thus, its
benefits—and costs—can always be assessed in terms of efficiencies at the
individual level that are simply aggregated up, and it is possible to imagine
the good’s production by some entity other than the state.
We think our account of the way in which people assess the rightfulness
of policing behavior is more consistent with Jeremy Waldron’s account of a
public good, which acknowledges that “no account of [its] worth to anyone
can be given except by concentrating on what [it is] worth to everyone
together.”88 Truly good policing, then, is enjoyed by all people in common,
regardless of whether they experience positive outcomes as individuals. The
unit of measurement here is not simply counting up and adding the
experiences of individuals, but instead trying to understand what we
experience at the community level.89 Generation of good policing is “wholly,
directly and reciprocally dependent upon its simultaneous generation for and
enjoyment by certain others.”90 It is the impact that the climate of policing
has on the overall community that is key, as opposed to thinking about the
relationship that particular individuals may or may not have with police.
We can go further and say that our argument not only implies a demand
for policing that is assertedly social, as Waldron suggests, but constitutive,
too, in the way that Ian Loader and Neil Walker claim. It is not enough for
policing to simply solve collective-action problems associated with the
project of crime reduction. Policing also can, and should, play a role in
producing positive feelings of self-identity that help to “construct and sustain
our ‘we-feeling’—our very felt sense of ‘common publicness.’”91
Legitimacy, then, can be a key driver of a healthy and properly functioning
democratic government.
We need to do more work to fully justify this last potentially normative
claim. No doubt many are made uncomfortable by the notion that police
88

JEREMY WALDRON, LIBERAL RIGHTS: COLLECTED PAPERS 1981–1991, at 358–59 (1993).
See ROBERT J. SAMPSON, GREAT AMERICAN CITY: CHICAGO AND THE ENDURING
NEIGHBORHOOD EFFECT 59–60 (2012) (coining the term “ecometrics” to explain the
measurement of social traits at the appropriate level of analysis, such as a neighborhood, that
is distinct from measuring such processes at the individual level).
90
IAN LOADER & NEIL WALKER, CIVILIZING SECURITY 154 (2007) (citation omitted).
91
Id. at 164.
89
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should be involved in this work. What we know, however, is that they are
involved in it. The empirical distinctions we demonstrate between lawfulness
assessments of police conduct on the one hand and fairness assessments on
the other powerfully suggest that people understand police treatment of
citizens in the constitutive manner that Loader and Walker describe. Indeed,
President Obama, in convening his Task Force on 21st Century Policing,
made this point when he said, “When any part of the American Family does
not feel like it is being treated fairly, it is a problem for all of us. It means we
are not as strong as a country as we can be.”92
The focus that people place upon the procedural justice of police actions
points first to the potentially negative consequences of an exclusive focus on
lawfulness. If police are not cognizant of, and responsive to, public concerns,
they are blind to the source of public feelings that police actions are
inappropriate and should be sanctioned. Further, police miss the opportunity
to be involved in the broader effort to build people’s ties to their communities
that create healthy and vibrant neighborhoods that are both more open to
cooperation with police and better able to generate the types of social and
other forms of capital that can help communities to “build their way out of
crime.”93

92
OFFICE OF CMTY. ORIENTED POLICING SERVS., FINAL REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT’S TASK
FORCE ON 21ST CENTURY POLICING 5 (2015).
93
BILL GELLER & LISA BELSKY, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, A POLICYMAKER’S GUIDE TO
BUILDING OUR WAY OUT OF CRIME: THE TRANSFORMATIVE POWER OF POLICE–COMMUNITY
DEVELOPER PARTNERSHIPS 45 (2009).
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Appendix A
Background Questionnaire
The background questionnaire asked respondents for information about their
demographic characteristics, experiences with the police, exposure to crime,
political beliefs, and prior attitudes towards law enforcement. Collecting this
information was necessary to ascertain what factors accounted for differences
across individuals and groups in their perceptions of the appropriateness of police
behavior and the legitimacy of these legal actors in particular contexts. With a rich
understanding of respondents’ backgrounds, we could test our hypothesis that
individuals form perceptions and evaluations of police–citizen interactions based
on their own (direct) experiences and indirectly or vicariously through the
experiences of others close to them. In other words, this personal data allowed us
to assess people’s psychological predispositions.
The information solicited in the questionnaire drew on work by Lawrence
Bobo and Devon Johnson that identified a range of factors differentiating views
among racial and ethnic groups on their experiences and views of criminal law
and criminal justice.94 Specifically, the questionnaire asked respondents about the
following topics:
1. Basic biographical and demographic information;
2.

Perceptions of crime in their neighborhood;

3.

Attitudes toward their local police department;

4.

Personal experiences with the police;

5.

Experiences of friends and relatives with the police;

6.

Views on appropriate police conduct;

7.

Attitudes about race;

8.

Perceptions of racial bias in the criminal justice system;

9.

Crime victimization of themselves or other family members;

10. Political orientation; and
11. Major life events.
The questionnaire consisted of 124 questions. There was no standard
question format. Rather, the format depended on what was being asked. Some
questions were open-ended; some were yes/no; some asked for answers on various
numerical scales; and some provided answer options that were specific to the
topic.

94
See Lawrence D. Bobo & Devon Johnson, A Taste for Punishment: Black and White
Americans’ Views on the Death Penalty and the War on Drugs, 1 DU BOIS REV. 151 (2004).
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Appendix B
Experiment
In the experiment, we showed respondents three videos of different police–
citizen encounters in randomized order. The videos, culled from police training tapes
and Youtube.com, were each thirty seconds long, captured real interactions between
police officers and citizens, and varied in the intensity of those interactions. The
three videos can be summarized as follows:
Video 1: Resisting arrest. A courteous, but stern, police officer confronts a
rude citizen during a nighttime traffic stop and attempts to place him under arrest,
but the citizen resists.
Video 2: Violent struggle. Two police officers engage in a violent struggle with
a large, aggressive citizen in a parking lot at night.
Video 3: Ambiguous arrest. A police officer questions a shirtless young man,
who appears to be confused, and eventually leads him away in handcuffs.
A critical aspect of the experimental component was that before watching each
video, respondents were provided with a brief paragraph description framing the
police–citizen encounter. This paragraph varied the conditions under which the
stop/arrest was made.
The manipulation had three possible states: good, neutral, and bad. Below is a
summary of the three states associated with the contextual dimension, along with
illustrative examples from the study (each video had a unique set of good, neutral,
and bad states):
Table 1
Context of Arrest/Stop
State
Example
Good
Legal arrest/stop “After the police officer received a dispatch
of an armed robbery committed in the area,
the individual in the video was stopped as he
was running from the location of the crime.”
Neutral
Ambiguous
“While the police officer was on routine
legality
patrol, the individual in the video was
stopped after the officer observed him
nervously looking at the patrol car and
increasing the pace of his walk.”
Bad
Illegal arrest/stop “The individual in the video was stopped
after the police officer observed him
walking down the street late at night.”
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Appendix B
Continued
Before viewing each of the three videos, respondents were primed with a
randomly assigned background description of the events in them. The contextual
prime was designed to focus respondents on particular aspects of the context
within which the encounters occurred, allowing us to assess the degree to which
people’s judgments about police behavior were influenced by how the incident
was framed.
We asked respondents to answer thirty-eight questions about what had
occurred in each video after they watched it. These questions required respondents
to state whether they “strongly agreed,” “agreed,” “neither agreed nor disagreed,”
“disagreed,” or “strongly disagreed” with each statement about the behavior of the
police officer(s) and the citizen in the video. (Respondents were also given the
option of answering that the statement “does not apply.”)
We also asked respondents to make evaluations utilizing the same five-point
scale:
 recall basic facts (e.g., “The police in the video displayed or used
weapons (club, gun).”);


assess the appropriateness of the citizen’s conduct (e.g., “The
citizen involved behaved appropriately towards the police.”);



assess the appropriateness of the police officers’ actions (e.g., “The
police behaved appropriately toward the citizen.”);



speculate as to the motivations of the police officers (e.g., “The
actions of the police officers were affected by the race of the
citizen.”);



evaluate the procedural fairness of the police officers’ actions (e.g.,
“The police in the video treated the citizen with respect and
dignity.”);



judge the legality of the police officers’ actions (e.g., “The police
officers violated the law.”); and



determine whether the police officers should be disciplined for their
behavior (e.g., “The officers involved should be reprimanded or
punished in some way.”).

We designed these questions to explore the psychological processes underlying
reactions to ambiguous events involving possible police misconduct that could
warrant some form of punishment.

1 Meares-Tyler (final to printer)

2015]

LAWFUL OR FAIR?

343

Appendix C
Sample
The study sample consisted of 1361 individuals age eighteen or older, drawn
randomly from a demographically diverse panel assembled by Knowledge
Networks (KN), an opinion research firm based in Menlo Park, California that
specializes in video-based surveys using the internet. KN retains a permanent
sample of approximately 40,000 individuals from which subsamples can be drawn
to carry out specific surveys. The KN panel sample is representative of the U.S.
population, which allows for stratification and representation across demographic
groups. Recruitment into the KN panel takes place through a random digit dialing
method to random samples of U.S. households. All members of the household are
invited to participate in the panel. Surveys are answered electronically either on a
computer or through a web-based TV connection. KN panel members receive free
internet access and email accounts, including equipment if needed. In some cases,
individuals are also paid a modest incentive fee to participate in the survey.
The 1361 individuals who participated in our study came from fifteen
geographically dispersed American cities. The number of individuals from each
city was: Baltimore (98); Boston (88); Chicago (94); Denver (89); Detroit (90);
Houston (87); Los Angeles (94); Miami (89); New York (85); Philadelphia (91);
Phoenix (96); San Diego (92); Seattle (90); and Washington, D.C. (89). These
cities were chosen because they represent a diverse range of critical
characteristics, such as demographics, crime levels, and police–community
relations.
The respondents were not a nationally representative survey. Therefore, the
appropriate baseline is not whether our respondents mirror the nation, but rather
whether there were enough individuals with varied demographic characteristics to
allow us to make plausible comparisons across groups. With this in mind, we
stratified the sample by race, gender, and age to achieve a healthy mix of each.
The race of the sample was: Caucasian = 58.6%; Hispanic = 18%; AfricanAmerican = 14.3%; Other = 6%. The gender was 47.7% male.
Ages were: 18–29 = 22.2%; 30–44 = 28.3%; 45–59 = 27.1%; 60+ = 22.3%
(Mean = 44).
For education level, the sample included: less than high school = 8.5%; high
school = 30.6%; some college = 26.7%; bachelor’s degree or higher = 34.2%
(Mean = some college but no degree).
Household incomes were: $0–$24,999 = 12.2%; $25,000–$49,999 = 23.2%;
$50,000–$99,000 = 41.8%; $100,000+ = 22.8% (Mean = $60,000).
For employment status: Working = 64%.
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